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Abstract
We show that social context matters in gender-paired dictator decisions. Our experiment
investigates the influence of gender-pairing and framing on monetary transfers in a 2x2x2
design where sender gender, recipient gender, and frame, i.e. give or take, are varied. We are
the first to combine all three variables and uncover that giving information about the gender
of the recipient accommodates framing effects. If each of the three manipulated variables
were to be analyzed independently, our data would confirm previous findings where females
transfer more than males and framing has no effect (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Dreber et al.,
2013). However, we investigate the manipulated variables in interaction and find that framing
matters when information about recipient gender is salient. For both genders, transfers in
opposite-sex pairs are always higher than in same-sex pairs, but significantly higher in the
take frame. We thus suggest that the gender composition of the sample, gender-pairing, or
beliefs about the counterpart’s gender should be controlled for in experiments testing gender
differences in social interaction.
Keywords: Framing · Gender Differences · Gender-Pairing · Dictator Game · Experiment
JEL Classification: C72 · C91 · J16
1 Introduction
The comparison between decision makers’ genders has been explored in experimental economics1,
but gender-paired interaction has been rarely considered. Most real-life interactions cannot be
modeled with an androgynous match, because individuals have either information, expectations,
or beliefs about their counterpart. For instance, counterpart gender has been shown to mediate
outcomes in strategic and non-strategic settings where the payoffs depend on the courtesy of
others. In restaurants it is frequently observed that males on dates and groups of males are more
generous towards waitresses than groups of females (Miller, 2000). Research in evolutionary
psychology argues that preferential behavior towards the opposite sex has a signaling role and
can be explained by the sexual selection hypothesis (Farrelly et al., 2007). Farrelly et al. (2007)
explain that interacting partners behave more cooperatively to increase their attractiveness.
The courtship behavior is meant to appear to be altruistically motivated particularly since it is
costly and non-reciprocal.
Evidence also suggests that sharing is decreased within same-sex pairs (Buunk and Massar,
2012). With mate competition for reproduction and survival being the norm, aggression within
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SCHW1537/1-1 for providing financial support for our research. We are also grateful to Peter Du¨rsch, Christiane
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1For a summary see Croson and Gneezy (2009).
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genders is higher (Trivers, 1972, ch. 7) and this is especially prominent for men (Buunk and
Massar, 2012). But also women see other women as competitors when gender is salient (Buss,
1999; Campbell, 1999; Kanazawa, 2005) and they become more competitive in single-sex envi-
ronments (Gneezy et al., 2003). Houser and Schunk (2009) show that even school-age girls are
already sensitive to gender-paired giving.
Given that gender considerations appear to be embodied in social interaction, we maintain
that gender composition of the experimental sample, gender-pairing, or beliefs about it are an
important factor for economic decision making and experimental methodology. Additionally,
behavior in social games is often context dependent (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and context
further interacts with gender (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) which is why the interplay of social
context and gender-pairing must be scrutinized.
Our study is the first to focus on the interplay of decision maker’s gender, his/her counter-
part’s gender, and framing. The most promising setting for this investigation is a non-strategic,
anonymous environment because it elicits social preferences in the absence of most exogenous
demands. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the existing litera-
ture is summarized. Section 3 presents the experimental design, followed by the hypotheses in
Section 4. The results and the regression analysis are discussed in Section 5 and we conclude in
Section 6.
2 Existing Literature
Individuals exhibit other-regarding preferences despite rational theory predicting the contrary
(Camerer, 2003, chap. 2). This is observed even under conditions of double-blindness (Hoffman
et al., 1996) and in contexts where reciprocity cannot be a motivational concern (Johannesson
and Persson, 2000). Other-regarding preferences are cross-cultural and have been motivated by
constructs such as inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), (impure) altruism (Andreoni,
1989), Rawlsian “social welfare” preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002), or other non-monetary
benefits (Aknin et al., 2013).
In analyzing giving behavior, female gender has been positively correlated with the amount
transferred (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Engel, 2011). However, gender effects seem to be context
dependent (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Bolton and Katok, 1995) since females’ preferences
are more sensitive to social cues (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). One factor influencing social
interaction is gender-pairing: offers are affected by the information on the responder gender.
In an ultimatum game by Solnick (2001) amounts proposed to men are larger, especially those
by women. Sutter et al. (2009) expand on this finding in a power-to-take game, reporting that
in same-sex pairs the amounts proposed are lower than those in opposite-sex pairs. Finally, in
a gender-paired dictator game, females transfer less to females than to males (Ben-Ner et al.,
2004). However, others find that there is no effect of gender-paired transfers, i.e. women propose
higher amounts regardless of responders’ gender (Eckel and Grossman, 2001). We think that
these mixed results are due to different design approaches, such as the social distance between
the participants and the decision elicitation method. In this paper we propose examining non-
strategic gender interaction in a double-anonymous setting.
Another important aspect regarding social games is framing. Bardsley (2008) and List (2007)
report that dictator giving might be an artefact of the experimental design while others report
that framing matters. Evidence in this direction exists in public goods and bargaining research
(Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000; Leliveld et al., 2008). Yet other authors find no framing effect in
dictator games (Dreber et al., 2013), in public goods contexts (Brandts and Schwieren, 2007),
or donations (Grossman and Eckel, 2012).
However, when the decision maker’s gender is scrutinized, framing creates differential effects.
Fujimoto and Park (2010) find that there are no gender differences in contributions under a
positive public goods frame, but women are more generous under a negative one. We go one
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step further and investigate the additional influence of a third factor—recipient gender—on
framed giving behavior. To our knowledge, we are the first to have employed a combination of
the three aspects: gender, gender-pairing, and framing.
3 Experimental Design and Implementation
We conducted a double-anonymous dictator game where gender-pairing and framing are com-
bined. In a 2x2x2 between-subjects design a) the framing of the decision is either give or take,
b) the dictator gender is varied, and c) the recipient gender is varied. The basic experimental
procedure, except gender-pairing, is a replication of Kettner and Waichman (2014)2.
The experiment was organized as follows: all participants were invited to the same room,
signed up and received a e5 show-up fee. They thus became aware of the gender composition
of the sample, and the fact that everybody had received the same show-up fee. Next, the way
that experiment unfolded was dependent on the gender composition of the sessions’ samples.
For same-sex sessions, the participants drew a number or letter indicating the room and seat
to which they were randomly assigned (numbers to dictators and letters to recipients). For
opposite-sex sessions, participants were directed towards different rooms and there drew the
seat number3. It is possible that separating participants by gender into different rooms might
create additional distance but it was the method we have chosen to maintain full anonymity
towards experimenters and other subjects.
After everyone had been assigned to a room and seated in a cubicle, the experiment be-
gan. In both rooms there were always two experimenters present –a male and a female– as
experimenter gender might influence decisions (Innocenti and Pazienza, 2006). The first page of
the instructions, including explanations on random matching and anonymity, was read aloud.
The remainder was read by the participants themselves. Dictators found two envelopes in their
cubicles, one labeled “Your Personal Envelope” and the other labeled “Other [male/female]4 Par-
ticipant’s Envelope”. In the give framing, e5 (ten e0.50 coins) together with ten metal washers
were in the “Your Personal Envelope” and the “Other Participant’s Envelope” was empty. In the
take framing, the e5 (ten e0.50 coins) together with ten metal washers were in the “Other Par-
ticipant’s Envelope” and the “Your Personal Envelope” was empty. The metal washers ensured
anonymity, as they mimic e0.50 coins in weight, diameter, and the noise they make. After being
asked to count the contents of the envelopes and check that both ten e0.50 pieces and ten metal
washers were in the correct envelope (depending on framing), participants made their decisions.
They were instructed to place ten coins or washers in the “Other Participant’s Envelope”. In
this way they could transfer from e0 to e5 in increments of e0.50 while ensuring their decision
remained anonymous. Therefore, neither the experimenters nor other participants could observe
decisions or connect a particular identity to a decision. Once a dictator had made a decision,
he/she placed the sealed envelope labeled “Other Participant’s Envelope” in a collection box
and started filling in demographic and psychometric questionnaires.
When all dictators had placed their sealed envelopes in the box, it was carried into the re-
cipient room5. The experimenters in the recipient room, who were at no point present while the
2Instructions are provided in the appendix.
3When participants who had signed up did not arrive on time and the group was uneven in number or in terms
of gender, we proceeded as follows: if the missing participant belonged to the recipient group, the participant
without a partner was assigned a dictator role and his/her decision was carried out and paired up by means of
a lottery. If the missing participant belonged to the dictator group, the participant without a partner could not
join the experiment.
4Gender is embedded in the inflection in the German language. It was therefore unnecessary to further
emphasize the recipient’s gender.
5The ten coins/washers that were not transferred by the dictator were placed in the personal envelope and
taken home. Therefore, dictators could not reveal their decision to the experimenter by returning the metal
washers.
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Give Framing
Treatment Male to Male (MM) Male to Female (MF) Female to Male (FM) Female to Female (FF)
Observations N=24 N=23 N=26 N=24
Age 23.52 (24) 22.48 (22) 22.27 (22) 23.17 (23)
Individual Income 678.26 (750) 691.30 (750) 601.92 (750) 650.00 (750)
Single 73.91% 82.61% 69.23% 50.00%
Household Size 3.61 (3) 2.96 (3) 2.69 (2) 2.54 (2)
Game Theory 56.52% 60.87% 23.08% 29.17%
Washer Value 4.96 (2) 5.26 (2) 15.29 (5) 15.85 (2.5)
Take Framing
Treatment Male to Male (MM) Male to Female (MF) Female to Male (FM) Female to Female (FF)
Observations N=26 N=25 N=23 N=24
Age 23.54 (22.5) 22.52 (23) 22.59 (22.5) 22.96 (22.5)
Individual Income 628.85 (750) 682.00 (750) 622.73 (750) 664.58 (750)
Single 80.77% 72.00% 72.73% 70.83%
Household Size 3.54 (3) 3.48 (3) 2.64 (2) 2.42 (2)
Game Theory 69.23% 64.00% 27.27% 41.67%
Washer Value 9.33 (4) 5.16 (5) 17.49 (5) 22.88 (5)
Note: the tables include mean values (where applicable, median values) and percentage frequencies
Table 1: Number of Independent Observations and Demographic Details per Treatment
dictators made their decisions, randomly distributed the envelopes to the recipients. The recip-
ients opened the envelopes and counted the contents. The experimenters in the recipient room
recorded the amounts transferred while the participants filled in demographic and psychometric
questionnaires.
The experiment took place at the AWI Lab of the University of Heidelberg in February,
April, and June 2013. Data was collected in thirty-three sessions with an average duration
of thirty minutes. 376 participants were recruited from the ORSEE-student-pool (Greiner,
2004) after filtering for experience in similar experiments. Five subjects were excluded owing to
their advanced age, two were excluded because they had misunderstood the instructions. After
exclusion, the sender sample contained a total of 195 independent observations. The mean
age of this sample was 22.89 and ranged from 18 to 33 years. 50.14% of the participants were
females and 46.15% took a class in game theory indicating at least preliminary economic training.
Another aspect we should mention is the valuation of the metal washers. Their market price
is between 2 and 4 cents per piece. The majority of the participants (89.23%) attributed them
a value below 50 cents with a mean of 12.01 cents (median = 4 cents). Further demographic
details and the number of observations per treatment are displayed in Table 1.
4 Hypotheses
In the analysis that follows we first test the robustness of previously reported results and then
uncover the interaction of the three manipulated variables. Namely, in Section (5.1) we check
whether females transfer and receive more than males, and framing does not matter. In Section
(5.2) we test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Framing does not affect higher transfers from and to females.
Hypothesis 2 Transfers in opposite-sex pairs are different from transfers in same-sex pairs;
this holds independent of framing.
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5 Results
5.1 Average Amount Transferred and Frequency of Non-zero Transfers
The average amount transferred in the pooled decisions was 20.92% of initial endowment. For
pairwise comparisons we use Mann-Whitney U-Tests and report significance levels. Dictator
gender played a significant role in the distribution of transfers, while framing did not. Female
dictators transferred 24.12%, while male dictators transferred 17.76% (p = 0.06). Recipient’s
gender did not influence transfers significantly, as females received 21.04% and males 20.81%
(p = 0.65). Finally, the framing of the decision did not play a role (p = 0.68). In the give frame
19.69% of the endowment was transferred; in the take frame 22.14% was sent to the recipient.
For the extensive margin, we analyze the percentage of participants transferring a non-zero
amount and compare it between genders and frames through χ2-tests. 54.87% of the senders
chose to transfer some money to the recipient. However, a split by dictator gender underlines
that females transferred more than males: 61.86% of the females and 54.08% of the males
transferred at least 50 cents (p = 0.05). Between recipient genders and frames no difference is
found: females received a non-zero amount in 58.33% of the cases, while males receive a non-
zero amount in 51.52% of the cases (p = 0.34). Give and take transfer frequencies were not
significantly different either (55.67% versus 54.08%; p = 0.82).
In summary, females are more likely to transfer non-zero amounts and, on average, transfer
higher amounts than males. In what concerns the recipient, males and females receive similar
average amounts and do not differ at the extensive margin. Finally, average transfers and
transfer frequencies do not differ between frames. Now we put our design to test and analyze
the interaction of the three manipulated variables.
5.2 Treatment Comparisons and Interaction Effects
Figure 1 displays the average transfers in percent for each of the eight experimental treatments.
As shown in the left side (give framing), females transferred higher amounts than males regardless
of recipient gender (on average 24.60% versus 14.47%; p = 0.02). This difference is due to higher
transfers to the opposite sex in the case of females and lower transfers towards the same sex in the
case of males (26.54% versus 11.67%; p = 0.05). This difference, driven by the sender’s gender,
disappears in the take frame (right side) where females and males transferred similar amounts
(23.62% versus 20.78%; p = 0.59). This stems from opposite-sex befriending behavior: females
transferred significantly more to males than to females (31.30% versus 16.25%; p = 0.05) and
males transferred significantly more to females than to males (27.60% versus 14.23%; p = 0.03).
Non-parametric tests comparing contributions between all experimental treatments are displayed
in Table 2.
Figure 2 presents non-zero transfer frequencies for all eight experimental treatments. In the
give frame females were on average more likely to transfer non-zero amounts (66.00% versus
44.68%; p = 0.04) and none of the genders discriminated one of the two recipient genders
(females gave to females 70.83% and females gave to males 61.54%; p = 0.48; males gave to males
41.67% and males gave to females 47.83%; p = 0.67). In the take frame transfer frequencies
analysis reveals the same pattern as the analysis at the intensive margin. On average, females
and males were equally likely to transfer non-zero amounts (57.45% versus 50.98%; p = 0.52).
When we consider gender-pairing we find again that in opposite-sex pairs the frequency of non-
zero transfers is significantly higher than in same-sex pairs. This result is robust across dictator
genders: females transferred non-zero amounts more frequently to males than to females (69.57%
versus 45.83%; p = 0.10) and males transferred non-zero amounts more frequently to females
than to males (68.00% versus 34.62%; p = 0.02).
Result 1a In the Give frame, females were generally more likely to transfer non-zero amounts
and, on average, transferred higher amounts than males.
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Gender-Pairing within Give and Take Framing
Give Framing Take Framing
MM vs MF p = 0.43 MM vs MF p = 0.03 (**)
MM vs FM p = 0.05 (**) MM vs FM p = 0.02 (**)
MM vs FF p = 0.03 (**) MM vs FF p = 0.60
MF vs FM p = 0.22 MF vs FM p = 0.66
MF vs FF p = 0.29 MF vs FF p = 0.07 (*)
FM vs FF p = 0.76 FM vs FF p = 0.05 (**)
Gender-Pairing and Framing Interaction
TMM TMF TFM TFF
GMM p = 0.93 p = 0.02 (**) p = 0.01 (**) p = 0.56
GMF p = 0.48 p = 0.12 p = 0.08 (*) p = 0.83
GFM p = 0.06 p = 0.76 p = 0.50 p = 0.15
GFF p = 0.07 (*) p = 0.50 p = 0.39 p = 0.18
Note: Results from Mann-Whitney U Tests; p values rounded to the second decimal;
in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05
Notation of the treatments: first letter indicates the framing (i.e. either Give or Take),
the second letter the gender of the dictator (i.e. either Female or Male), and the third
letter shows the recipient gender (i.e. either Female or Male)
Table 2: Treatment Comparison
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Figure 1: Average Amount Transferred in Percent by Treatment
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Figure 2: Non-zero Transfers: Frequencies by Treatment
Result 1b In the Take frame, transfer frequencies and average transfers were not different
between dictator genders.
Result 2 Framing matters in gender-paired decisions: opposite-sex preferences were stronger
when the endowment belonged to the recipient6. Average transfers were higher in opposite-
sex pairs, but only significantly higher in the take frame.
The exposed interplay of the three binary variables, i.e. framing, dictator gender, and recipient
gender, is further scrutinized in a regression analysis.
Regression Analysis
In Table 3 we specify five regression models to explain the amounts transferred in our experiment
and thus confirm the results of the pairwise tests. Since our data is censored, the Tobit estimation
with robust standard errors is the most applicable way of testing our models 7 (Engel, 2011).
The first model solely includes the frame (0=Take, 1=Give), a dummy for the sender’s gender
(0=Male, 1=Female), and a dummy for the recipient’s gender (0=Male, 1=Female). Model (2)
expands with the interactions of the three dummies, and Model (3) adds the triple interaction.
Further, to test the robustness of our results, Model (4) includes the following demographic
controls: age in years, income category, relationship status (0=Relationship, 1=Single), and
household size. Lastly, Model (5) controls for the additional effect of game theory knowledge
as we expect that trained participants will adopt a rational behavior more often (Marwell and
Ames, 1981; Frank et al., 1993).
Our results can be summarized as follows: in the limited Model (1) only the sender’s gender
reveals a positive, significant coefficient. Therefore, controlling for framing and recipient gender,
we confirm the previously discussed findings where females transfer significantly more than
males. In Model (2) the sender’s gender maintains a positive, significant coefficient, while the
recipient’s gender coefficient also becomes positive and significant. This indicates that females
6We are claiming that the endowment belonged to the recipient, but we are aware of the fact that the dictator
–having to physically manipulate the money– might have developed ownership over it.
7Additionally, we re-run the models as a robust standard error OLS. Results are presented in the appendix
(Table 5).
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receive higher transfers. Framing, in line with Dreber et al. (2013), does not affect transfers.
However, the interaction of sender and recipient gender reveals a significant, negative coefficient.
This shows that the recipient’s gender negatively affects the positive effect of the sender’s gender
on the amount transferred. Plainly, the fact that females transfer generally more is reversed
when the recipient is another female. This supports the results we explained in the previous
subsection, where in female-female pairs (and also in male-male pairs) transfers are lower than
in mixed pairs. In this model, framing interacted with either sender or recipient gender does
not reveal a change in the first difference. When we control for the triple interaction in Model
(3), we see a weakly significant indication of how framing affects the interplay of sender and
recipient genders: the second difference decreases when framing changes from Take to Give.
Model (4) supports these results and further demonstrates that they are independent of age,
income, relationship status, and household size8. Model (5) additionally shows that holding ev-
erything else constant, education in game theory influences transfers negatively, as we expected.
Nonetheless, all previous effects from Model (4) remain, except the coefficient of the sender’s
gender, which weakens. We interpret this as an indication that education/expert knowledge
converges (female) subjects into rational behavior.
To parallel the extensive margin tests, we additionally apply a logistic model with robust
standard errors. Explanatory variables included in Models (6)-(10) are equivalent to Models
(1)-(5) and results, i.e. marginal effects, are presented in Table 4. We re-confirm the previ-
ous findings: in the limited model the sender’s gender weakly influences transfer probabilities,
meaning that females are more likely to transfer non-zero amounts. This persists and is even
more pronounced in the later models, where we introduce more controls. In Model (7) the co-
efficient of the recipient’s gender increases, although it remains insignificant. The interaction of
sender and recipient gender is negative and significant, allowing us to restate that the second
difference affect the sender’s gender effect. Framing and its interactions are insignificant and,
at this point, an overall influence of framing can be rejected. Finally, the triple interaction
effect in Model (8) reveals the influence of framing on the second difference of gender-pairing.
This should be read as follows: higher transfer frequencies exist in mixed pairs, but this effect
of gender-pairing is more pronounced in the take framing. Models (9) and (10) strengthen our
findings, proving that the effects we claim are mediated by education, but hold independent of
age, income, relationship status, and household size.
8We must specify that most of our participants were single and they are thus driving the results. If we re-run
the models in the small subsample of individuals in a relationship, the effects we report disappear. This does
not mean there are no effects for committed individuals, but only that this subsample is too small to draw any
definitive conclusions. Our data suggests that the influence of marital status should be analyzed in a larger
sample.
8
Model Model Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Framing (0 = Take, 1 = Give) -3.085 -11.36 -0.469 1.311 -1.906
(5.858) (10.63) (12.59) (12.42) (12.36)
Gender Sender (0 = Male, 1 = Female) 12.20** 21.63** 31.60** 34.80*** 23.96*
(5.902) (10.58) (12.71) (12.60) (12.16)
Gender Recipient (0 = Male, 1 = Female) 2.485 16.96* 26.58** 27.60** 26.08**
(5.814) (9.864) (11.57) (11.58) (11.38)
Framing x Gender Sender 12.70 -7.355 -10.91 -8.808
(11.41) (17.06) (16.95) (16.22)
Framing x Gender Recipient 3.622 -17.05 -19.23 -17.83
(11.46) (16.69) (16.47) (16.01)
Gender Sender x Gender Recipient -31.61*** -51.21*** -54.53*** -49.69***
(11.47) (16.73) (16.76) (16.08)
Framing x Gender Sender x Gender Recipient 39.66* 44.23* 41.15*
(22.94) (22.51) (21.56)
Age 0.690 0.872
(1.038) (0.991)
Income Category 0.965 1.063
(5.511) (5.349)
Relationship Status (0 = Relationship , 1 = Single) 5.011 5.721
(6.778) (6.619)
Household Size -0.0946 -0.470
(1.446) (1.438)
Game Theory (0 = No, 1 = Yes) -23.35****
(5.842)
Constant 2.804 -1.136 -6.223 -27.63 -14.29
(6.340) (8.550) (9.671) (28.44) (28.29)
sigma Constant 37.62**** 36.46**** 36.22**** 35.76**** 33.93****
(2.450) (2.399) (2.368) (2.360) (2.334)
N 195 195 195 193 193
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 3: Tobit Regression Results
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Model Model Model Model Model
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Framing (0 = Take, 1 = Give) 0.0122 -0.0785 0.0739 0.0981 0.0707
(0.0723) (0.127) (0.144) (0.144) (0.155)
Gender Sender (0 = Male, 1 = Female) 0.139* 0.199* 0.347*** 0.390*** 0.310**
(0.0711) (0.119) (0.134) (0.134) (0.152)
Gender Recipient (0 = Male, 1 = Female) 0.0690 0.190 0.331** 0.341** 0.348**
(0.0720) (0.117) (0.131) (0.133) (0.141)
Framing x Gender Sender 0.149 -0.162 -0.221 -0.213
(0.137) (0.206) (0.206) (0.213)
Framing x Gender Recipient 0.0270 -0.277 -0.308 -0.306
(0.146) (0.191) (0.189) (0.199)
Gender Sender x Gender Recipient -0.272** -0.519**** -0.553**** -0.548****
(0.135) (0.137) (0.132) (0.142)
Framing x Gender Sender x Gender Recipient 0.447**** 0.473**** 0.472****
(0.116) (0.0999) (0.101)
Age 0.00223 0.00446
(0.0138) (0.0141)
Income Category -0.00852 -0.000264
(0.0709) (0.0747)
Relationship Status (0 = Relationship , 1 = Single) 0.0862 0.108
(0.0878) (0.0927)
Household Size 0.00223 -0.00252
(0.0183) (0.0175)
Game Theory (0 = No, 1 = Yes) -0.260****
(0.0781)
N 195 195 195 193 193
Note: marginal effects reported; robust standard errors in parentheses;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 4: Logistic Regression Results
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6 Conclusion
We have shown that in a non-strategic game gender-pairing matters and social context influ-
ences preferential money transfers towards the opposite sex. Generally, both females and males
transfer more to the other gender. Yet, common favoritism is statistically significant only when
context implies that the endowment, but not the decision, belongs to the recipient. We conclude
that framing matters for gender-paired dictator games.
Gender considerations are important in social interactions and social interactions are rarely
context-free. Thus, the interaction between gender-pairing and framing should not be ignored.
If we overlook this interaction, our data confirms that females transfer more than males and
framing does not matter. But, as pointed out before, we discovered that gender-paired dictator
game transfers can be context-sensitive. That is, females take significantly more from females
than from males and give less to females than to males when the money is theirs. In a similar
fashion, males take significantly more from males than from females and give less to males than
to females when the endowment belongs to them.
For now we cannot disentangle the motives behind this observed behavior, but we would
like to signal the importance of gender-pairing for social games and its interaction with framing.
Additional insights into the motives might be gained in settings where money transfers are
publicized, the marital status is revealed, or the allocation of the endowment is also determined
by an effort task in both frames.
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Appendix
Model Model Model Model Model
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b)
Framing (0 = Take, 1 = Give) -2.682 -7.111 -2.564 -1.899 -3.575
(3.280) (5.085) (5.560) (5.636) (5.816)
Gender Sender (0 = Male, 1 = Female) 6.464* 12.42** 17.07** 19.04** 13.25*
(3.287) (6.093) (7.297) (7.398) (7.135)
Gender Recipient (0 = Male, 1 = Female) 0.159 8.917 13.37** 13.95** 13.34**
(3.279) (5.414) (6.144) (6.177) (6.150)
Framing x Gender Sender 6.994 -2.202 -3.966 -2.771
(6.459) (9.597) (9.817) (9.470)
Framing x Gender Recipient 1.638 -7.645 -8.688 -7.652
(6.443) (8.392) (8.449) (8.304)
Gender Sender x Gender Recipient -19.14*** -28.42*** -30.67*** -28.20***
(6.451) (9.541) (9.757) (9.430)
Framing x Gender Sender x Gender Recipient 18.66 21.34* 19.27
(12.86) (12.87) (12.42)
Age 0.467 0.557
(0.583) (0.557)
Income Category 1.162 1.520
(3.010) (2.940)
Relationship Status (0 = Relationship , 1 = Single) 2.734 3.458
(3.921) (3.888)
Household Size -0.157 -0.409
(0.750) (0.772)
Game Theory (0 = No, 1 = Yes) -13.61****
(3.262)
Constant 18.96**** 16.41**** 14.23**** -0.326 6.694
(3.159) (3.983) (4.200) (15.64) (15.73)
N 195 195 195 193 193
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses;
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 5: OLS Regression Results
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Instructions
In what follows we present the translated instructions of the Give Male to Female treatment.
Please note that the translation highlights the gender of both sender and recipient. In German
this is not necessary since gender is embedded in the inflection. The original German instruc-
tions, except for the gender-pairing details, were used by Kettner and Waichman (2014).
General Information
Dear (male) participant,
Thank you for participating in this study on decision making. In the following you will be in-
formed about the rules and procedures. Every (male) participant has received the same printed
instructions as you did. Please take your time and read the instructions carefully.
No communication with other (male) participants
All decisions in this study are private. Please do not communicate with the other (male) par-
ticipants. Otherwise, we are forced to exclude you from the experiment and you will have to
forgo your payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The (male or female)
experimenter will answer your question quietly.
Anonymous matching
In this study, you will be randomly matched with another (female) participant from the other
room. The randomization is carried out according to the number you drew during registration
at the beginning of this study. The matching will not be made public and no (male) participant
can reconstruct which other (female) participant he is matched to.
This experiment is completely anonymous. Your identity will not be made public
and you will not receive information about the identity of the other (male) partic-
ipants in this room and the other (female) participants in the other room.
General information about the decision task
Both you and the matched (female) participant received 5e for your participation at the begin-
ning. In addition to this, you have another 5e which is in your personal envelope, on the table
in front of you. The other matched (female) participant has nothing (0e).
You can now leave the amount you just received unchanged or reduce it, and in-
crease the amount of the (female) participant you have been matched with.
How to make your decision
On the table in front of you, you see two envelopes: one is your personal envelope and the
other envelope belongs to the other (female) participant. In order to distinguish between the
envelopes, they are marked: your personal envelope is marked ”YOUR PERSONAL ENVE-
LOPE”; the envelope of the other (female) participant is marked ”ENVELOPE OF OTHER
(FEMALE) PARTICIPANT”.
Content of the two envelopes
Your personal envelope contains a total of 20 coins, out of which ten are 50 cents coins (5e)
and ten are worthless coins (metal washers). The washers have the purpose of keeping your
decision completely anonymous with respect to other persons including the (male and female)
experimenters.
The envelope of the other (female) participant is empty.
Please make sure, that your personal envelope contains ten 50 cents coins and ten worthless
washers by emptying the contents onto the table in front of you.
Receipt 2: This receipt is only for accounting purposes. After you signed the receipt, we ask
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you to place it in the sealed collection box and continue with your decision. The sealed box is
used so that the (male and female) experimenters cannot see the name written on the receipt.
All (male) participants in this room sign the second receipt. The (female) participants in the
other room will not sign such a receipt.
The Decision
After you have emptied the contents of your personal envelope on the table in front of you and
signed the receipt, please put exactly ten coins/washers back in your personal envelope. Simi-
larly, put exactly ten coins/washers into the envelope of the other (female) participant. In the
appendix, we present all possible decisions (for the appendix see last page of instructions).
Completing the decision and sealing the envelopes
As soon as you have made your decision, put your personal envelope into your pocket (coat
etc.). Please seal the envelope of the other (female) participant (i.e. use the flap-tape to seal
the envelope) and place it in the box located behind you, on the floor. (Important: Please do
not hand the envelope to another person or to the (male or female) experimenter, but place it
directly in the collection box.)
After all (male) participants in this room have made their decision, a (male or female) experi-
menter will carry the box to the other room in which a second (male or female) experimenter will
take over the box and distribute the envelopes to the assigned (female) participants. Nobody in
the other room is informed about your identity.
Anonymity
We have planned the experiment in a way which guarantees your anonymity at all times.
1. Your identity is never revealed to another person.
2. The (male or female) experimenter who distributes the envelopes to the (female) partic-
ipants in the other room was not present at the time you made your personal decision.
He or She and the other (female) participants do not know from whom they received the
envelope.
3. After the decision we will ask you to fill in an anonymous questionnaire. The questions
are used for the evaluation of the study and none of your answers can be linked to your
identity.
Thank you very much for your support!
16
[Translated Instructions of the Take Female from Female treatment]
General Information
Dear (female) participant,
Thank you for participating in this study on decision making. In the following you will be
informed about the rules and procedures. Every (female) participant has received the same
printed instructions as you did. Please take your time and read the instructions carefully.
No communication with other (female) participants
All decisions in this study are private. Please do not communicate with the other (female)
participants. Otherwise, we are forced to exclude you from the experiment and you will have to
forgo your payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The (male or female)
experimenter will answer your question quietly.
Anonymous matching
In this study, you will be randomly matched with another (female) participant from the other
room. The randomization is carried out according to the number you drew during registration at
the beginning of this study. The matching will not be made public and no (female) participant
can reconstruct which other (female) participant she is matched to.
This experiment is completely anonymous. Your identity will not be made public
and you will not receive information about the identity of the other (female) par-
ticipants in this room and the other (female) participants in the other room.
General information about the decision task
Both you and the matched (female) participant received 5e for your participation at the be-
ginning. In addition to this, the other (female) participant you are matched with has another
5e in the envelope labeled envelope other (female) participant. It is found on the table in front
of you. You have nothing (0e).
You can now leave the amount she just received unchanged or reduce it, and in-
crease the your amount.
How to make your decision
On the table in front of you, you see two envelopes: one belongs to the other (female) partic-
ipant and the other is your personal envelope. In order to distinguish between the envelopes,
they are marked: the envelope of the other (female) participant is marked ”ENVELOPE OF
OTHER (FEMALE) PARTICIPANT”; your personal envelope is marked ”YOUR PERSONAL
ENVELOPE”.
Content of the two envelopes
The envelope the (female) participant contains a total of 20 coins, out of which ten are 50 cents
coins (5e) and ten are worthless coins (metal washers). The washers have the purpose of keep-
ing your decision completely anonymous with respect to other persons including the (male and
female) experimenters.
Your personal envelope is empty.
Please make sure, that the envelope of the other (female) participant contains ten 50 cents coins
and 10 worthless washers by emptying the contents onto the table in front of you.
Receipt 2: This receipt is only for accounting purposes. After you signed the receipt, we ask
you to place it in the sealed collection box and continue with your decision. The sealed box is
used so that the (male and female) experimenters cannot see the name written on the receipt.
All (female) participants in this room sign the second receipt. The (female) participants in the
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other room will not sign such a receipt.
The Decision
After you have emptied the contents of the envelope of the other (female) participant on the
table in front of you and signed the receipt, please put exactly ten coins/washers back in the
envelope of the other (female) participant. Similarly, put exactly ten coins/washers into your
personal envelope. In the appendix, we present all possible decisions (for the appendix see last
page of instructions).
Completing the decision and sealing the envelopes
As soon as you have made your decision, put your personal envelope into your pocket (coat
etc.). Please seal the envelope of the other (female) participant (i.e. use the flap-tape to seal
the envelope) and place it in the box located behind you, on the floor. (Important: Please do
not hand the envelope to another person or to the (male or female) experimenter, but place it
directly in the collection box.)
After all (female) participants in this room have made their decision, a (male or female) experi-
menter will carry the box to the other room in which a second (male or female) experimenter will
take over the box and distribute the envelopes to the assigned (female) participants. Nobody in
the other room is informed about your identity.
Anonymity
We have planned the experiment in a way which guarantees your anonymity at all times.
1. Your identity is never revealed to another person.
2. The (male or female) experimenter who distributes the envelopes to the (female) partic-
ipants in the other room was not present at the time you made your personal decision.
He or She and the other (female) participants do not know from whom they received the
envelope.
3. After the decision we will ask you to fill in an anonymous questionnaire. The questions
are used for the evaluation of the study and none of your answers can be linked to your
identity.
Thank you very much for your support!
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You Other (female)
participant
Return to your personal envelope Place in envelope of other (female)
participant
5e 0e 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers
4.5e 0.5e 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers
4e 1e 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers
3.5e 1.5e 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers
3e 2e 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers
2.5e 2.5e 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers
2e 3e 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers
1.5e 3.5e 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers
1e 4e 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers
0.5e 4.5e 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers
0e 5e 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers
Table 6: Last Page of the Instruction: Give Male to Female
Other (female)
participant
You Return to other (female) participant
envelope
Place in your envelope
5e 0e 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers
4.5e 0.5e 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers
4e 1e 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers
3.5e 1.5e 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers
3e 2e 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers
2.5e 2.5e 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers
2e 3e 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers
1.5e 3.5e 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers
1e 4e 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers
0.5e 4.5e 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers
0e 5e 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers
Table 7: Last Page of the Instruction: Take Female from Female
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